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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2) and Rule
42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiffs and Appellees on the issue of Boundary by Acquiescence.
Standard of Review: An order granting summary judgment is a question of law
which is reviewed de novo. Jones v. ERA Brokers Consolidated, 2000 UT 61,6 P.3d
1129. Whether a given set of facts gives rise to a determination of acquiescence is
reviewable as a matter of law. However, this legal determination is highly fact sensitive
and thus the trial court has some measure of discretion. Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v.
Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah App. 1999).
Preservation in Record Below: This issue was addressed by the Lauders and
Fergusons in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Oral Argument ( R. 41-68 and 427)
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in striking portions of the Lauder and
Ferguson affidavits.
Standard of Review: A district court's legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness without deference to the lower court. Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, f 9, 94
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P.3d 211.
Preservation in Record Below: This issue was addressed by the Lauders and
Fergusons in their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike
Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits. ( R. 141-165)
Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred in not striking portions of the Martin
affidavits.
Standard of Review: A district court's legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness without deference to the lower court. Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, f 9, 94
P.3d211.
Preservation in Record Below: This issue was addressed by the Lauders and
Fergusons in their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of
Affidavits of Darrell Eskelson and Diane Martin. ( R. 166-171)
Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred in striking the affidavit of Tony Shiraki as
irrelevant on the grounds that Shiraki is not an adjoining owner of the disputed property.
Standard of Review: A district court's legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness without deference to the lower court. Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31 ? f 9, 94
P.3d211.
Preservation in Record Below: This issue was addressed by the Lauders and
Fergusons in their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike
Inadmissible Portions of Affidavits. ( R. 141-165)
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Issue 5: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the equitable estoppel
argument as moot because the elements of boundary by acquiescence were not met.
Standard of Review: The trial court's legal conclusions and granting or denial of
summary judgment is reviewed for correctness viewing the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The
doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable to a wide variety of factual and legal situations
and therefore the court grants the trial court's decision a fair degree of deference. Bahr v.
Imus, 2009 UT App 155 (Utah App. 2009).
Preservation in Record Below: This issue was addressed by the Lauders and
Fergusons in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Oral Argument.
Issue 6: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the Plaintiffs
based solely on its denial of summary judgment for the Defendants.
Standard of Review: An order granting summary judgment is a question of law which is
reviewed de novo. Jones v. ERA Brokers Consolidated, 2000 UT 61, 6 P.3d 1129
Preservation in Record Below: This issue was addressed by the Lauders and Fergusons
in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Oral Argument.

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules are relevant to this appeal:
Utah Code Ann, § 78A-4-103(2)(j):
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response.
Rule 602 Utah Rules of Evidence:
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to
prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness' own testimony. This
rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert
witnesses.

Rule 42 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
(a) Discretion of Supreme Court to Transfer. At any time before a case is set for
oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals
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any case except those cases within the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction. The order
of transfer shall be issued without opinion, written or oral, as to the merits of the appeal
or the reasons for the transfer.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case

This is a boundary dispute case in which Plaintiffs took down a fence that had
been in place since the 1970's to build a new one in a different location. Defendants
Mary Best Ferguson and Ed and Cindy Lauder objected to the building of a new fence on
a different line than the old fence line because permanent structures would have to be
moved. Defendants based their objections on the legal theories of boundary by
acquiescence and boundary by estoppel. Appellees, Bruce and Diane Martin
("Plaintiffs"), by and through counsel filed a complaint to quiet title in the disputed strip
of property on November 27, 2007.
II.

Course of Proceedings

After the case was filed, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on
October 21, 2008 on the issue of Boundary by Acquiescence. Plaintiffs filed a Crossmotion for Summary Judgment on November 13, 2008. A hearing was held on April 1,
2009 before Judge Dever on the cross motions for Summary Judgment. On June 17, 2009
Defendants filed their notice of appeal of the summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.
III.

Disposition at Trial Court

The District Court held oral arguments on the Summary Judgment issues on April
1, 2009. The District Court issued a ruling on April 17, 2009 denying Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment and granting Plaintiffs' Cross-motion for Summary
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Judgment. On June 2, 2009, the District Court issued a Final Judgment Quieting Title in
Favor of Plaintiffs and Awarding Costs against Defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Sometime during the 1970's, Joe and Helen Eskelson, previous owners of

Plaintiffs' property, built a fence on the northern boundary line of their property
(hereafter, the "Fence"). Affidavit of Cynthia Lauder, f 2 ("Lauder Aff.") attached hereto
as "Exhibit D"; Affidavit of Mary Best Ferguson, f 2 ("Ferguson Aff.") attached hereto as
"Exhibit C"; Affidavit of Tony Shiraki, | 3, ("Shiraki Aff.") attached hereto as "Exhibit
F"; see Map attached as "Exhibit K".
2.

The Fence has separated the Plaintiffs and Defendants properties for at least

27 years. Lauder Aff., | 3, Ex. D; Ferguson Aff., | 3, Ex. C; Shiraki Aff., f 4, Ex. F.
3.

The Eskelson's neighbor to the west was Tony Shiraki. Shiraki Aff., f 2,

Ex. F; Lauder Aff., | 4, Ex. D.
4.

Mr. Shiraki moved next door to the Eskelsons during the late 1970's.

Shiraki Aff., | 2, Ex. F.
5.

Mr. Shiraki's fence on his northern boundary line follows the exact line of

the Fence in dispute. Shiraki Aff., f 8, Ex. F; Lauder Aff., f 5, Ex. D.
6.

Stephen K. Clark was the owner of the parcel of property (hereinafter the

"Lauder Property") now owned by Defendants Edwin and Cynthia Lauder (hereinafter the
"Lauders"), located at 1898 E. Rich Way, Salt Lake City Utah, 84121. See Aff. of
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Stephen K. Clark, f 3, Ex. G.
7.

Stephen K. Clark purchased the Lauder Property on June 11, 1986. See

Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, f 4, Ex. G.
8.

After purchasing the Lauder Property and until he sold the Lauder Property

to the Lauders, through their builder, on or about December 1991, the Lauder Property
consisted only of an empty lot. See Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, | 5, Ex. G.
9.

Stephen K. Clark is familiar with the Lauder Property and the adjoining

property, now owed by Defendant Mary Best Ferguson (hereinafter the "Ferguson
Property"), having visited frequently. See Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, f 6, Ex. G.
10.

Stephen K. Clark is familiar with the adjacent property to the south, then

owned by Joe Eskelson and now owned by Plaintiffs Bruce and Diane Martin (hereinafter
the "Martin Property"). See Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, f 7, Ex. G.
11.

Stephen K. Clark is familiar with the state and condition of the Lauder

Property and Ferguson Property from the year 1986 until he sold his portion of the
property to the Lauders in December 1991. See Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, f 8, Ex. G.
12.

Stephen K. Clark is familiar of the state and condition of the Lauder

Property and Ferguson Property based on his own personal observations during the times
that he visited the Lauder Property following his purchase of it in 1986. See Aff. of
Stephen K. Clark, f 9, Ex. G.
13.

Stephen K. Clark visited the Lauder Property several times after purchasing
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it. See Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, f 10, Ex. G.
14.

Stephen K. Clark walked the boundaries of the property several times. See

Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, | 11, Ex. G.
15.

It was Stephen K. Clark's original intent to build on the Lauder Property

when he bought it on June 11, 1986. See Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, | 12, Ex. G.
16.

During the period in which Stephen K. Clark owned the Lauder Property, a

fence line ran near and along the South side of the Lauder Property and the Ferguson
Property (hereinafter the "Fence") in the area that is in dispute in the above-reference law
suit (hereinafter the "Disputed Area"). See Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, | 13, Ex. G.
17.

Based on his personal observations, from the time Stephen K. Clark

purchased the property on June 11, 1986 until he sold it to the Lauders, there were no
improvements made to the Fence. See Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, ^f 14, Ex. G.
18.

Based on his personal observations, from the time Stephen K. Clark

purchased the property on June 11, 1986 until he sold it to the Lauders, no one ever
removed weeds from or in the Disputed Area. See Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, | 15, Ex. G.
19.

Based on his personal observations, from the time Stephen K. Clark

purchased the property on June 11, 1986 until he sold it to the Lauders, no neighbors on
the South side of the Fence in the Disputed Area accessed, maintained, or used the strip
of land in the Disputed Area. See Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, f 19, Ex. G.
20.

Based on his personal observations, from the time Stephen K. Clark

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

purchased the property on June 11, 1986 until he sold it to the Lauders, he is not aware of
ever having seen anyone but his wife and himself in the Disputed Area. See Aff. of
Stephen K. Clark, t 20, Ex. G.
21.

From the time Stephen K. Clark purchased the property on June 11, 1986

until he sold it to the Lauders, it was his belief that the Fence that was in the Disputed
Area was the property boundary and he treated the Fence as the boundary line. See Aff.
of Stephen K. Clark, f 21, Ex. G.
22.

From the time Stephen K. Clark purchased the property on June 11, 1986

until he sold it to the Lauders, he treated the Fence as the boundary line. See Aff. of
Stephen K. Clark, | 22, Ex. G.
23.

When Stephen K. Clark and his wife would visit the Lauder Property from

the time he purchased the property on June 11, 1986 until he sold it to the Lauders, they
visited the Lauder Property often. See Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, Tf 23, Ex. G.
24.

When Stephen K. Clark and his wife would visit the Lauder Property from

the time he purchased the property on June 11, 1986 until he sold it to the Lauders, when
walking on the Lauder Property, they walked along the Fence in the Disputed Area. See
Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, f 24, Ex. G.
25.

From the time Stephen K. Clark purchased the property on June 11, 1986

until he sold it to the Lauders, he and his wife treated the Fence in the Disputed Area as
the boundary line and they believed it to be the true and correct boundary line. See Aff.
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of Stephen K. Clark, f 25, Ex. G.
26.

From the time Stephen K. Clark purchased the property on June 11, 1986

until he sold it to the Lauders, no neighbor to the South ever went on, possessed, or took
any actions that he is aware of to suggest that the Fence in the Disputed Area was not the
true and correct boundary line. See Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, f 26, Ex. G.
27.

From the time Stephen K. Clark purchased the property on June 11, 1986

until he sold it to the Lauders, no individual he is aware of ever used or asserted control
of the property in the Disputed Area. See Aff. of Stephen K. Clark, | 27, Ex. G.
28.

Defendants Ed and Cindy Lauder (hereafter, "Lauder") began building their

home in 1991. Lauder Aff., f 6, Ex. D.
29.

The Lauders moved in to their home in May of 1992. Lauder Aff., f 7, Ex.

30.

The Lauders immediately began weeding their property up to the Fence

D.

line. Lauder Aff., | 8, Ex. D.
31.

Defendant Mary Ferguson built and moved into her home in 1994, which is

east of the Lauder's property and north of Plaintiffs' property. Ferguson Aff., ^j 4, Ex. C.
32.

Defendant Mary Ferguson made improvements to her property up to the

Fence line; including, building a retaining wall, landscaping up to the Fence line, and
removing a cement curb and gutter that had existed. Ferguson Aff., f 5, Ex. C.
33.

The Lauders made improvements up to the Fence line; including, removing
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the cement curb and gutter, planting trees, and installing sprinkler pipe in 1993 and
thereafter. Lauder Aff., f 9, Ex. E.
34.

The cement curb which was located north of the Fence line had been in

place since the 1970fs. Shiraki Aff., f 9, Ex. F.
35.

Joe Eskelson, the prior owner of Plaintiffs' property was present and aware

of Defendants' improvements and never objected. Lauder Aff., f 10, Ex. D; Ferguson
Aff., f 6, Ex. C.
36.

Plaintiff Diane Martin acquired the Eskelson's property in 2007, and began

making improvements on the structure. Lauder Aff., | 11, Ex. D.
37.

Plaintiff acquired a survey in August, 2007. Lauder Aff., f 12, Ex. D.

38.

One morning in the Fall of 2007, the Lauder's found that the Fence had

been cut down and a work crew was ready to build a new fence. Lauder Aff., f 16,
21.Ex. D.
39.

This action commenced in December of 2007 when Plaintiffs filed suit to

quiet title in the disputed strip. (R. 1-6)
40.

Defendants made improvements up to the Fence line, as evidenced by,

sprinkler pipes, trees, cement patio, landscaping, a retaining wall, and removal of the
cement curb and gutter, which had been in place since the 1970's. Lauder Aff., | 15, Ex.
D; Ferguson Aff., f 14, Ex. C.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should overturn the summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and
grant summary judgment on the issue of boundary by acquiescence in favor of the
Defendants/Appellants. It is undisputed that sometime in the 1970's? the prior owner of
Plaintiffs' property, her father Joe Eskelson, built a fence on the north side of their
property. In 1986, Stephen K. Clark purchased what is now the Lauder property, which
lies to the north of Plaintiff's property, with the intention of building a home there. He
visited the property many times with his wife and family and walked the boundaries of the
property often. In 1991, the Lauder Defendants purchased the lot owned by Stephen K.
Clark and began building a home on the lot.
In or around 1994, Defendant Mary Ferguson purchased the lot to the east of the
Lauders and also to the north of Plaintiffs. From the year 1986 until 2007, the parties
treated the fence on the north of Plaintiffs' property as the boundary line and lived up to,
but not over the fence line. Defendants put up a perpendicular fence, placed a concrete
patio and laid sprinkler pipes up to the fence line. On or about 2006, the owner of
Plaintiffs' property died and Plaintiffs' obtained control of their property.
In August of 2007, Plaintiffs' threw down the fence and attempted to build a fence
north of the prior fence line that had been in place since the 1970's. When Defendants
refused to allow the building of a fence north of the old fence line, Plaintiffs' filed this
law suit to quiet title to the disputed area. Defendants claimed in their answer that they
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are the owners of the disputed area by the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
First, the trial court erred in denying Appellants' motion for summary judgment on
the issue of boundary by acquiescence. Utah law is clear on this issue and the trial court's
application of this law to the facts of this case was in error. The fence in dispute has been
in place for over 30 years and treated as the boundary line. The trial court erred in finding
that there was not mutual acquiescence from the period of at least 1986 to 2007.
Second, the trial court erred in finding that the 20 years acquiescence requirement
was interrupted simply because the deed from Stephen Clark to the Lauders was in the
name of Designer Homes, the Lauders' builder. This is not a correct interpretation of
Utah law as the twenty year requirement can only be interrupted through common
ownership of both properties or state ownership.
Third, the trial court erred in striking portions of the Lauder affidavits and in not
striking portions of the Martin affidavits.
Fourth, the trial court erred in striking the affidavit of Tony Shiraki as irrelevant
simply because he was not an adjoining owner of the disputed property. Utah law allows
for testimony on the issue of acquiescence to come from sources other than only adjoining
property owners in the dispute.
Fifth, the trial court erred in dismissing the equitable estoppel argument as moot
simply because it found that the elements of boundary by acquiescence were not met.
Equitable estoppel is a theory separate from boundary by acquiescence and an alternate
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theory on which this court could decide that the original fence line became the new
boundary line.
And, finally, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the
Plaintiffs/Appellees based solely on its denial of summary judgment for the
Defendants/Appellants. Utah law is clear that where cross-motions for summary
judgment are filed, the denial of one does not automatically lead to the granting of the
other.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE HAD ESTABLISHED THE
EXISTING FENCE LINE AS THE BOUNDARY LINE

Utah law is well settled on the issue of boundary by acquiescence. A finding of
such requires "(f) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or
buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a period of at least
20 years, (iv) by adjoining landowners." Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah
1996). Each of these elements is met in this case. Element four is undisputed. The
Martin property is adjacent to both the Lauder and Ferguson properties. It is also
undisputed that the fence stood as a visible line and monument between the properties
from sometime in the 1970's until October of 2007. A finding of boundary by
acquiescence in this case therefore hinges on whether there was mutual acquiescence in
the fence line as the boundary for 20 years. The undisputed material facts show that
Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest acquiesced for the requisite amount of time through 1)
silence; 2)failure to object when improvements were made by the Lauders and Fergusons
in the disputed area on several occasions; and 3) by overt statements made by Plaintiffs'
predecessor in interest.
The first element of boundary by acquiescence is occupation up to a visible line
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings. The undisputed fact is that Plaintiff Diane
Martin's father, Joe Eskelson, the property owner prior to Diane's acquiring the property
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in 2007, built the fence between the properties in dispute sometime in the 1970's. The
fence has served as a visible marking between the properties since that time and was not
removed until three months prior to the filing of this action in December of 2007.
The second element of boundary by acquiescence is mutual acquiescence in the
line as a boundary. Utah courts have held that "[u]nder the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence, the party attempting to establish a particular line as the boundary between
properties must establish that the parties mutually acquiesced in the line as separating the
properties." Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 788 (Utah 2002). To acquiesce means to
"recognize and treat an observable line, such as a fence, as the boundary dividing the
owner's property from the adjacent landowner's property." Id.
Acquiescence may be inferred from evidence such as the landowner's actions with
respect to a particular line which may evidence that the landowner impliedly consents, or
acquiesces, in that line as the demarcation between the properties. See Id. Further, courts
have held that various landowner actions such as occupation up to, but never over, the
line is evidence of acquiescence, see Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420-21 (Utah
1990), or that acquiescence may be shown by silence, or the failure of a party to object to
a line as a boundary. See Judd Family Ltd. P'ship v. Hutchings, 797 P.2d 1088, 1090
(Utah 1990); see also Mason v. Loveless, 24 P.3d 997, 1004 (Utah App. 2001) ("[0]ur
settled case law ... clearly provides that acquiescence may be established by silence.").
The facts show that acquiescence was established in this case by the Eskelsons' overt
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statements, by silence and by failure of a party to object. Any one of these elements alone
could establish acquiescence, and Defendants have shown all three.
A.

Acquiescence Occurred Through Silence

The trial court made several material errors in its analysis of whether elements (ii)
mutual acquiescence and (iii) for a period of at least 20 years were met. While the
Lauders and Fergusons owned their parcels of land beginning in 1991 and 1994
respectively, evidence from Stephen Clark, the owner of the Lauder parcel from 19861991 and Tony Shiraki, the adjacent landowner to the west of Plaintiff s property from
1975-1996, showed that acquiescence occurred from at least 1986 to 2007, and perhaps
even earlier.
It is clear from the evidence that after Joe Eskelson built the fence between the
properties in the 1970fs, he never used the disputed property in any way. Although Diane
Martin never owned or lived in the property adjacent to the Lauders and Fergusons prior
to 2006, she attempted to testify in her affidavit that "her family" made use of the
property by storing debris, chasing away pests, and planting flowers in the disputed area.
There was no gate in the fence they built through which they could access the disputed
area. Even assuming these events occurred, there is no evidence in the record that they
occurred after 1986. There was trash and leaves and cement curbing in the disputed area.
Plaintiffs claim they used the disputed area to store construction debris. The debris was
dumped all over the properties, not just in the disputed area, however, and it was never
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reclaimed. If it were intended for storage, as Plaintiffs claim, rather than to be discarded,
it would have been reclaimed at some point. There was no subsequent retrieval of the
debris, or objection by Mr. Eskelson when he witnessed the Lauders and Fergusons
removing the debris from the property over a period of time at great cost of both time and
money to them.
B.

Acquiescence Occurred Through Failure to Object

Mr. Eskelson had plenty of opportunity to object to removal of such allegedly
"stored" materials, yet he remained silent when improvements to the disputed area were
taking place. Sprinkler pipes were laid in the disputed area. A cement patio was being
poured in the disputed area. A perpendicular fence was built in the disputed area. Trees
were planted in the disputed area. Mr. Eskelson witnessed these improvements, and
never objected. This is evidence of his acquiescence in the fence line he built as being
the boundary line.
C.

Acquiescence Occurred Through Overt Statements

Not only did Plaintiffs' predecessor failed to speak or object to improvements, they
overtly made statements to Defendants showing their acquiescence in the fence line as a
boundary. Ed Lauder testified in his deposition that while he was cutting branches from
trees growing on the Eskelson's property that hung over the fence to the Lauder property
that Mrs. Eskelson stated "[y]ou can cut any branches of trees that go over [the fence]
onto your side of the property." See Aff. of Edwin Lauder, f 12, Ex. 3. Thus

19
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

communicating her belief that she considered anything north of the fence line to be
Lauder property.
It is undisputed that there was mutual acquiescence in the fence as a boundary line
for the sixteen-year period of 1991 (when the Lauders purchased their lot) to 2007 when
the Martins took down the fence. The only disputed time period in this case is whether
during the four-year period of 1987 to 1991 there was mutual acquiescence in the fence as
boundary line before Defendants lived there. Because the Lauders and Fergusons did not
own their respective properties for twenty years, evidence of mutual acquiescence is
shown through the testimony of Stephen Clark, who was the owner of the Lauder parcel
from 1986 to 1991.
D.

Acquiescence Can Occur Where there is an Undeveloped Lot

The parcel owned by Stephen Clark prior to the Lauders was an undeveloped lot,
and Plaintiffs continue to rely on that fact alone to argue that mutual acquiescence could
not have occurred. However, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Harding v. Allen, 10
Utah 2d 370, 353 P.2d 911 (Utah 1960) that boundary by acquiescence could be acquired
even in the case of one of the adjacent lands being vacant. The Court stated:
[t]he occupancy intended as a requirement in satisfying the rule may be actual or
constructive, by an owner, who may frequently or occasionally enter and
physically occupy his land, but who must be shown to have occupied it thus at
such reasonable intervals and during a period within which a boundary by
acquiescence might be acquired, as to have knowledge of the physical facts that,
through passage of time, might create rights in others to his land under the
doctrine, with an opportunity to interrupt their fruition
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Id. Stephen Clark's testimony showed that he frequently entered the land at reasonable
intervals and at all times throughout the year during his time of ownership.
Thus, he definitely meets the occupancy requirements set forth in Harding that he
entered and physically came upon the land enough to have knowledge of the physical
facts and that there were no improvements or managing of the property north of the fence
line to cause him to notice anyone asserting control over, or maintaining the disputed
area.
Utah case law does not require that Clark live on the land in order to establish
occupancy for purposes of acquiescence, nor does the law require that he make
improvements up to the fence line or on the fence itself. The requirement of occupancy
set forth by the Court in Harding is that the property owner frequently or occasionally
enter and physically occupy his land during the period in which acquiescence might be
acquired, to have knowledge of the physical facts. Harding at 914. His testimony shows,
and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that Clark entered and walked around the lot on numerous
occasions over the five-year period of his ownership and was certainly aware of the
conditions on and around his land. Clark stated in his deposition, "I didn't build on the
lot. But I planned, blueprinted, drafted, sketched, all those things . . . [I] [s]tood with my
back against [the fence] and planned where I was going to build my patio." See
Deposition of Stephen Clark p. 54, lines 14-21. Thus, mutual acquiescence can be shown
during the five-year period of Clark's ownership of the Lauder parcel from 1986 - 1991 in
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both Clark's and the Eskelsons treatment of the disputed area.
Additionally, while there is no evidence given as to the prior owner's treatment of
the Ferguson property as the prior owner is deceased, this court has stated that
"acquiescence of the predecessors in interest may be established without presenting their
testimony" and that testimony of acquiescence is relevant from other sources, including
adjoining neighbors, as Clark is in this case, as well as Shiraki, especially where the
predecessors in interest are deceased. Martin v. Nielson, 2009 WL 543804 (Utah
App.)(unpublished). Certainly if Eskelson is shown to have acquiesced in the Lauder
portion of the fence line as the boundary, then he also acquiesced in the Ferguson portion
of the fence line as the boundary.
According to testimony from Clark and Shiraki, Eskelson did not treat the disputed
area any differently on the Ferguson portion of the disputed property than on the Lauder
portion. Plaintiffs concede in Eskelson's acquiescence of the property from the period of
time in which the Lauders and Fergusons owned their respective properties, thus, the only
relevant period in dispute is from 1986- 1991 and Clark's testimony clearly shows mutual
acquiescence during that time frame.
Plaintiffs claim that a fence put up alone is not evidence of acquiescence, yet they
rely on cases where temporary fences were put up and moved around for purposes of
corralling cattle and sheep. See Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979); see also
Brown v. Jorgenson, 2006 UT App 168, 136 P.3d 1252. These are not the facts in this
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case. This was not a temporary fence. It was never moved during its entire existence.
The fence was put up at the back of the property in the traditional boundary line area. It
was in line with the fences on the properties to the east and west of the Eskelson property.
Further, there was no way to access the disputed area for storage, retrieval, or
maintenance of said property without climbing the fence. If the Eskelsons had intended
to access, maintain or store items on the disputed property, they would have built a gate in
which to enter the area. There is no gate in the fence Eskelson built or easy access to the
disputed property and there never has been. This court has stated "[i]ndeed, a thing as
simple as '[occupation up to, but never over, the line is evidence of acquiescence.'"
Martin v. Nielson, 2009 WL 543804 (Utah App)(unpublished)(quoting Ault v. Holden,
2002UT221Jl8,44P.3d78l).
E.

The Twenty Year Clock Was Never Interrupted

The trial court made another critical error in its boundary by acquiescence analysis
in ruling that the clock on the twenty year boundary by acquiescence requirement was
restarted simply because the deed from Stephen Clark to the Lauders was put in the name
of the builder with whom the Lauders contracted to build their home. As stated in their
depositions, Designer Homes was the contractor the Lauders used to build their home.
Plaintiff never made the argument in briefs or oral arguments that this somehow broke up
the chain of title, or the Lauders would have simply responded that in order to purchase
the property from Stephen Clark, the Lauders had to put the purchase amount of the lot
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under the construction loan during the construction of the house. Stephen Clark was not
aware of this as he had no dealings with Designer Homes. The Lauders negotiated the
purchase of the property directly with Stephen Clark and finalized the transaction with
him. The title was briefly in the name of the developer during construction of the home,
but the Lauders were under contract with Designer homes to buy the property and the
home. The Lauders helped build the home, visited the site daily, and were on the
property during all the critical phases of the construction. Thus the testimony of Designer
Homes with respect to the disputed area is neither relevant nor material to a finding of
mutual acquiescence. While the title to the property was briefly in the name of the
Designer Homes, it was on behalf of the Lauders and only for the duration of the
construction.
The trial court erred in ruling that the conveyance of the property from Clark to
Designer Homes, Inc., and then to the Lauders was a brief disruption of the boundary line
sufficient to restart the clock for determining boundary by acquiescence. Utah law states
that the clock on boundary by acquiescence is restarted if the disputed properties are
every jointly owned by one owner, or if the property is ever state owned. See Orton v.
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 1998). Even the case cited by the trial court as basis
for restarting the 20 year clock states that common ownership of adjoining properties
restarts the clock for determining boundary by acquiescence. There is neither joint
ownership nor state ownership in this case and therefore the trial court erred in
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determining that the 20 year clock should be reset simply because the deed was first
conveyed to the builder with whom the Lauders contracted as the payment for the lot fell
under the construction loan.
F.

The Payment of Taxes is Not a Requirement of Boundary by
Acquiescence

The trial court also relied on payment of taxes on the disputed piece of property as
evidence of non-acquiescence. While evidence of knowing payment of taxes can be seen
as inconsistent with acquiescence (See Argyle v. Jones, 2005 UT App at Tf 15), the
amount of taxes due on an undeveloped strip of land at the back of the property ranging
from .87 feet to 3.92 feet in width would be so minimal - likely less than fifty dollars per
year considering the square footage - as to be difficult to parse from the entire amount of
taxes due and hardly worth the time and effort it would take to get approval of the
reduction from the appropriate tax authority. Thus, the payment of taxes on the small
portion of disputed property at issue in this case has no bearing on the issue of either
party's acquiescence and while it can be seen as evidence of such in certain cases, is not a
requisite element in a finding of boundary by acquiescence.
This court stated in Mason v. Loveless, 2001 UT App 145, 24 P.3d 997, "[m]utual
acquiescence in a line as a boundary has two requirements: that both parties recognize the
specific line, and that both parties acknowledge the line as the demarcation between the
properties." (quoting Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 1999 UT App 366, | 8,
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993 P.2d 229.) Both parties on either side of this fence line recognized and
acknowledged the fence as the demarcation between the properties for at least a period of
twenty years. This was not a fence put up to keep in cattle or to be moved around. This
fence had only one purpose: to be a boundary between properties, and has existed as such
since the 1970's.
Acquiescence has been established by silence, failure to object, and overt
statements. The Eskelsons never objected to improvements being made and debris being
removed from the disputed area, and they made overt statements indicating their belief
that the fence line was the property line. If the Eskelsons had intended to assert control
over the disputed area north of the fence line, the time to do so would have been when the
Lauders and Fergusons moved in and began making improvements and removing debris.
Yet, the Eskelsons chose to remain silent, thus evidencing their acquiescence in the fence
line they built as being the boundary line at least from 1986-2007 and most likely even
earlier. The elements of boundary by acquiescence have all been met in this case and the
trial court was incorrect in denying summary judgment to the Defendants on this issue.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING PORTIONS OF THE
LAUDER AFFIDAVITS AND IN NOT STRIKING PORTIONS OF
THE MARTIN AFFIDAVIT

While boundary by acquiescence is the main issue in this appeal, the trial court
also should have struck much of the affidavits of Darrell Eskelson and Diane Martin
because they lacked foundation to establish the affiant's personal knowledge. Utah law
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states affidavits in support of a motion for summary judgment "shall be made on personal
knowledge." Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e). Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: "A
witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." Utah R.Evid. 602.
Plaintiffs' affidavits lack foundation to establish the affiant's personal knowledge.
First, paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 from the Affidavit of Darrell Eskelson should
have been stricken for lack of foundation and personal knowledge. Affiant Darrell
Eskelson states that he lived at the property at issue from 1972 to 1978. Aff. of Darrell
Eskelson, f 2. Over 28 years had passed from when Darrell Eskelson moved from the
property in 1978 until when Plaintiffs moved onto the property in 2007. In terms of
acquiescence, anything Darrell Eskelson alleged to have done in regards to the disputed
strip during his six year stay in the 1970's is irrelevant because a twenty year period is
easily established after he left the property. Moreover, any statements by Darrell
Eskelson regarding the property after 1978 lacked foundation and personal knowledge
because it is unclear where Darrell Eskelson lived, whether he personally witnessed the
facts he alleges, and at what time period his alleged facts occurred.
Similarly, much of Diane Martin's affidavit should have been stricken for lack of
foundation and personal knowledge. Mrs. Martin does not state anywhere in her affidavit
that she lived at the property prior to moving there in 2007. Therefore, Mrs. Martin lacks
personal knowledge as to whether her family accessed the disputed strip of land and
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should not have been allowed to testify to such. Also, there is no reference in her
testimony to any time frame when the disputed strip of land may have been accessed,
which is relevant to this matter. Diane Martin never states in her affidavit whether she
personally witnessed the acts to which she testifies for her "family" or whether she herself
personally performed the actions to which she testifies.
It is also unclear whether Mrs. Martin was living, visiting, or observing the
property during this time because it is unclear when the time frame of her statement took
place and where Mrs. Martin lived during that time. Simply, there is no foundation laid
that establishes that Mrs. Martin could have witnessed such acts. These same arguments
apply to statements in her affidavit where Affiant Diane Martin states that she and her
family placed cement and curb north of the fence line and always treated the strip of land
in dispute as rightfully owned property. Aff. of Diane Martin, Til 11* 16. There is no
foundation for these statements establishing Mrs. Martin's personal knowledge. There is
no foundation that Mrs. Martin lived or observed the property in a manner to testify that
she "always" treated the disputed property as her own, unless she is only referring to the
time frame of 2007 until the present time.
In conclusion, the above referenced statements by Affiant Darrell Eskelson and
Affiant Diane Martin lack "evidence...sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter." Utah R.Evid. 602. Therefore, the trial court should
have granted Defendants' Motion to Strike the inadmissible portions of Plaintiffs'
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affidavits.
In his ruling, Judge Dever stated that while the affidavits contained some
statements that are inadmissible, they do not prejudice the opposing parties rather, they
serve to supplement the respective parties' arguments, (citing Broadwater v. Old
Republic Sur., 854 P. 2d 527, 533-34 (Utah 1993)). As discussed more fully below,
Judge Dever was inconsistent in allowing Diane Martin and Darrell Eskelson to testify to
events in relation to their family's actions and the disputed strip when Diane Martin never
lived in the property before 2007 and Darrell Eskelson did not live in the property after
1978, nearly eight years prior to the date when the Lauders and Fergusons can show that
mutual acquiescence occurred. Yet, the trial court did not allow the testimony of Shiraki
as he ruled it irrelevant since Shiraki was not an adjoining landowner. Applying the same
standard set forth in Broadwater, the trial court should have allowed the statements of the
Lauders. The trial court seemed to arbitrarily strike portions of the Lauder and Ferguson
affidavits without reasoning. Yet, they would have been admitted as evidence and should
have been allowed to stand.
Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an affidavit in
support of a motion for summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e).
Defendants' statements set out in affidavits should have been allowed to stand because
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Defendants' affidavits are (1) based on personal knowledge and (2) are statements which
would ultimately be admitted into evidence. Therefore, it was error to strike relevant
portions of the Lauder and Ferguson affidavits.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE AFFIDAVIT OF
TONY SHIRAKI AS IRRELEVANT

Judge Dever struck the affidavit of Tony Shiraki stating that it was irrelevant
because he was not an adjoining landowner who could show mutual acquiescence. This
is incorrect. Case law does not state that only adjoining landowners can testify as to
relevant actions of landowners. Tony Shiraki was a landowner that lived adjacent to the
Martin and Lauder properties before the Lauders and Martins owned the properties. His
testimony is relevant as to the actions he witnessed in relation to the Eskelsons, who built
the fence, and their treatment of the disputed area. This court stated in RHN Corp. v.
Veibell, 2004 UT 60, | 26, 96 P.3d 935, "the absence of direct evidence of a prior
owner's subjective belief concerning the boundary is not fatal to an assertion of mutual
acquiescence." Therefore "'acquiescence, or recognition, may be tacit and inferred from
evidence, i.e., the landowner's actions with respect to a particular line may evidence the
landowner impliedly concerts, or acquiesces, in that line as the demarcation between the
properties.'" Id. at f 24 (quoting Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, | 18, 44 P.3d 781). Thus,
Tony Shiraki's witness as to Mr. Eskelson's actions with respect to the fence and the
disputed property is indeed relevant.
Had Mr. Shiraki's affidavit not been ruled as irrelevant, it would have shown that
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he witnessed the actions of his adjoining neighbors, the Eskelsons, in relation to the
disputed area for many years prior to the Lauders and Fergusons moving on to their
properties. He testified in his affidavit that he never witnessed the Eskelsons planting or
growing flowers, trees or shrubbery beyond the fence line, or even crossing the northern
fence line or treating the property beyond the fence line as their own. Diane Martin was
never an owner of the disputed property until 2006. Nor had she ever lived in the
property until that time, yet she was allowed to testify in affidavits as to the actions of
"her family" during the period prior to her ownership. This was incorrect and should not
have been allowed. As Shiraki's testimony was relevant as to the actions he witnessed
and its bearing on acquiescence, it should have been allowed to stand.
IV.

THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL ALSO APPLIES TO FIND THAT
THE FENCE LINE BECAME THE BOUNDARY LINE.

The issue of the ownership of the disputed property could also be decided on an
alternate theory of equity estoppel. The trial court dismissed this theory without any
discussion as moot, simply because it found that there was no boundary by acquiescence.
This is incorrect and is a misunderstanding of this theory. Equitable estoppel is a
completely separate theory on which this case could be decided and is not dependant upon
the elements of boundary by acquiescence. This court recently decided in Bahr v. Imus,
2009 UT App 155, that a boundary line could be established on a theory of boundary by
estoppel. In reaching its decision, the court found that the requisite elements in a finding
of boundary by estoppel are: "'(i) a . . . failure to act [that is] inconsistent with a claim
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later asserted; (ii) reasonable action . . . taken . . . on the basis of the failure to act; and
(iii) injury . . . would result from allowing [a repudiation of] such . . . failure to act.'" Id.
at IT 6, quoting Dahl Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT app 391,1 14, 101 P.3d 830.
The requisite elements for a finding of boundary by estoppel are met in this case.
Joe Eskelson built the fence in the 1970's. He lived in his home and was even present on
certain occasions when the Fergusons and Lauders were removing construction debris
and cement curbing from the disputed area and he neither did anything or said anything to
indicate to the Lauders or the Fergusons that the area in question was his property that he
intended to use. In reliance on his silence and failure to object to the removal of property
and improvements in the disputed area, both the Fergusons and the Lauders made
permanent improvements to the disputed area including building a perpendicular fence,
placing sprinkler pipe, planting trees and foliage and pouring a cement patio. Allowing
the Martins to take advantage of these improvements and now claim this property after
her father failed to object would result in injury to the Fergusons and the Lauders
including the destruction and removal of such permanent improvements. Therefore, the
elements of boundary by estoppel have been met and the fence line should be established
as the boundary line under this theory as well.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS BASED SOLELY ON ITS DENIAL
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS.

In its ruling, and without reasoning, the trial court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for
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Summary Judgment based solely on its denial of summary judgment for Defendants. This
is an incorrect interpretation of the law. Utah law is clear that where cross-motions for
summary judgment are filed, the denial of one does not automatically lead to the granting
of the other. This Court has held, "our reversal of the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of one party on cross-motions for summary judgment does not imply
that the trial court is therefore bound to grant the other party's cross-motion for summary
judgment on remand

" Dunlap v. Stichting, 2005 UT App 279 1 5, 119 P.3d 302,

304-305 (citing Diamond T Utah, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 21 Utah 2d 124, 441 P.2d
705, 706 (1968) (holding that 'it is not true that once both parties move for summary
judgment the court is bound to grant it to one side or another").
CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that the parties treated the fence as a boundary line from 19912007. The testimony of Stephen Clark shows acquiescence from 1986-1991. Thus, there
was significant evidence to show that mutual acquiescence occurred for a period of at
least twenty years from 1986-2007, and therefore the fence line had become the boundary
line between the properties through boundary by acquiescence.
Additionally, the elements of boundary by estoppel were met and was an alternate
theory upon which the trial court should have decided that the fence line became the
boundary line.
Accordingly, the grant of Summary Judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs should be
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overruled and this Court should grant Summary Judgment in favor of the Lauders and
Fergusons. The Lauders and Fergusons request an award of their costs on appeal and an
order vacating the award of costs to Plaintiffs.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE and DIANE MARTIN, individuals,
Plaintiffs,
RULING
vs.
EDWIN and CYNTHIA LAUDER,
individuals, JOHN and MARY BEST
FERGUSON, individuals,

Case No. 070916752
Judge: L.A. DEVER

Defendants.
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Cross-motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs'and
Defendants' Motions to Strike. Having heard the parties arguments on Wednesday,
April 1, 2009, the Court makes the following Ruling.
Motions to Strike
On February 3, 2009, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Inadmissible
Portion of Affidavits. Plaintiffs were ordered to prepare an Order. To date, Plaintiffs'
order is not reflected in the record. Also, on February 10, 2009, Plaintiffs' Motion to
Strike Affidavit of Stephen Clark was denied. However, the Court granted Plaintiffs1
l9lotion to Strike portions of the Lauder depositions. Aside from the noted Court rulifigs,
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Defendants concede that they did not own their respective properties until"the
earliest 1991 which is years less than the 20 years required for boundary by
acquiescence. (Defs.' Reply nos. 11-12); see Arqyle v. Jones, 2005 UT App 346, fl 12,
118 P.3d 301 ("In order to establish a boundary by acquiescence claim, the plaintiff
must show that mutual acquiescence lasted for at least twenty consecutive years."
(citation omitted) (emphasis added)); (explaining that because three years elapsed
between the construction of the fence in 1958 and the purchase of the disputed property
in 1961, the twenty-year requirement was not met). Defendants therefore, rely on
affidavits to establish the elements of boundary by acquiescence.
The Affidavit of Tony Shiraki ("Shiraki") is irrelevant as Shiraki is not an adjoining
owner of the disputed property who can show mutual acquiescence. Defendants
maintain that Stephen Clark ("Clark"), owner of the Lauder lot from approximately 19861991, can show that Plaintiffs acquiesced to the fence as the boundary for the five year
period of time thereby, satisfying the required elements.
Acquiescence is a "highly fact dependent question[.]" RHN Corp., 2004 UT at fl
24 (quotation omitted). "Mutual acquiescence in a line as a boundary has two
requirements: that both parties recognize the specific line, and that both parties
acknowledge the line as the.demarcation between the properties." Wilkinson Family

3
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acknowledges that items were discarded beyond the fence either by Plaintiffs, others, or
both. (Clark Dep. 45:19-22, 46:12-14, Mar. 3, 2009). Additionally, Clark acknowledged
that it appeared that items had been discarded from the other side of the fence, that is
Plaintiffs' side. jd. at 46:17-23. Moreover, Clark was uncertain as to whether that the
refuse pile was added to during the five year period in which he was the lot owner, jd.
at 47:13-16; see Arqyle, 2005 UT App at ^ 15, ("The record owner of property need not
take legal action against a non-owner occupier to maintain legal rights in the property;
rather he must only take some action manifesting that he does not acquiesce or
recognize a particular line as a boundary." (quotation omitted)).
Clark also states that he treated the fence as a boundary "[n]o differently than
that site block or the other boundaries[.f jd. at 55:2-6. Furthermore, when asked
whether during the five years Clark left any evidence suggesting to anyone looking at
the disputed area that he asserted ownership of it, Clark responded, "Not other than to
plan its use:" id. at 59:6-13; see also Arqyle, 2005 UT App at fl 13 (w[T]he mere fact that
a fence happens to be put up and neither party does anything about it for a long period
of time will not establish it as the true boundary." (quotation omitted)).
Clark further affirmed that the deed conveying the lot to the Lauders was from
Designer Homes, Inc., the developer, and not Clark, id. at 42:18-25, 44:7-22. No
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been able to determine, our case law on acquiescence has never found
acquiescence in a fence or monument short of the true boundary when an
owner was unable to physically possess the full extent of his described
property. The rule of boundary by acquiescence serves a useful and
practical purpose when applied in the typical fact situation, where
adjoining owners are seemingly content to recognize a marked line or
monument not on the true line as the practical boundary between them.
However, it would be an unwarranted extension of the rule to apply it
where part of an owner's land is landlocked and his or her use of that part
is impossible. In that situation, the owner's conduct in not using that part
cannot realistically be characterized as acquiescence or consent by
silence.
jd. Plaintiffs assert that "the fence was constructed because of the then-existing drop in
elevation and Mr. Eskelson's interest in enclosing a portion of his property." (Pis/ Opp.
and Cross-mot. 3, no. 2, 9, no. 6). Clark also discussed a "slope." See generally (Clark
Dep. 29:10, Ex. 2). Specifically, Clark explained, "Our intent was to - - and as I recall, it
sloped in such a way that would have an advantage in our lot. Because those who
would be built to the west of use would be lower than us. It's just the way the slope
worked/'..]^ at 34:10-14.
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants cannot show acquiescence as a matter
of law1, that is, that "both parties recognize[d] the specific line, and that both parties
1

While summary judgment can only be granted if the record shows that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles, Chartered. 681 P.2d 1258,1261 (Utah 1984) (citations
omitted), Defendants1 Statement of Additional Material Facts, which pertain to Clark's Affidavit, when read
in conjunction with X^rk's Deposition, do not rise to the level of a genuine issue of material fact See
Sanns v. Butterfield Ford. 2004 UT App 203, U 6,94 P.3d 301 ("A genuine issue of fact exists where, on

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling dated
this

\ip

day of April, 2009, postage prepaid, to the following:

Mark O. Morris
Emily Jackson
Snell & Wilmer, LLP
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Beneficial Tower
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Richard N. Barnes
Christopher F. Lewis
Jonathan D. Bletzacker
Stepan Lewis & Paxman, LC
7410 South Creek Road, Suite 100
Sandy, UT 84093
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JUN

03m

Prepared and Submitted By:
Mark O. Morris (4636)
Emily Jackson (11678)
Snell & Wilmer LLP.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Beneficial Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE and DIANE MARTIN, individuals,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

FINAL JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS AND
AWARDING COSTS AGAINST
DEFENDANTS
Civil No.: 070916752

EDWIN and CYNTHIA LAUDER, and
MARY BEST FERGUSON,

Honorable L.A. Dever

Defendants.

This case came before the Court for oral argument on cross-motions for summary
judgment on April 1, 2009- Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1301, et seq.* and for the reasons more particularly expressed in this
Court's April 17,2009 Ruling already entered herein, and good cause appearing therefore:
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

• Defendants* Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

IO055419
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EXHIBIT A

10055419

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Richard N. Barnes (#8892)
Christopher F. Lewis (#8556)
STEPAN LEWIS & PAXMAN, LC
7410 S. Creek Road, Suite 100
Sandy, Utah 84093
Telephone: (801) 233-0606
Facsimile: (801) 233-0607
Attorney for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRUCE AND DIANE MARTIN,

:

Plaintiffs,

:
:

v s .

•

EDWIN AND CYNTHIA LAUDER,
individuals, and JOHN AND MARY BEST
FERGUSON, individuals,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY BEST
FERGUSON
:

:
:
:
:
:

:

•

•

•

Case No.: 070916752

Judge: L.A. Dever

)
) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
May Best Ferguson, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this

Affidavit.
2.

Sometime during the 1970's, Joe and Helen Eskelson built a fence on the northern

boundary line of their property.
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EXHIBIT D
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Richard N. Barnes (#8892)
Christopher F. Lewis (#8556)
STEPAN LEWIS & PAXMAN, LC
7410 S. Creek Road, Suite 100
Sandy, Utah 84093
Telephone: (801) 233-0606
Facsimile: (801) 233-0607
Attorneyfor Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRUCE AND DIANE MARTIN,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF CYNTHIA LAUDER

vs.
Case No. .070916752
EDWIN AND CYNTHIA LAUDER,
individuals, and JOHN AND MARY BEST
FERGUSON, individuals,

Judge: L.A. Dever

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Cynthia Lauder, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this

Affidavit
2.

Sometime during the 1970's, Joe and Helen Eskelson built a fence on the northern

boundary line of their property.
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15.

I told Diane Martin in the Fall of 2007 that the fence line is the proper property line and

that even if it were not, the fence line had become the true boundary line through the doctrine of
Boundary by Acquiescence.
16.

One morning in the Fall of 2007, we found that the fence had been cut down and a work

crew was ready to build a new fence.
17.

When I inquired of the plaintiffs as to where they were going to put the new fence,

plaintiffs1 responded "on our property", without any more specifics.
18.

As a result of the vague answer and worrying that the plaintiffs would remove parts of the

perpendicular fence, the sprinkler pipe, trees, and the Ferguson's cement patio, we called the
Sheriff to halt the building of a new fence.
19.

No one from plaintiffs' property has ever shown any signs of ownership or control in the

disputed area to the north of the fence line.
DATED this / ~ * A - d a y of October, 2008.

/?

(\MmrhAJ\ Y^cZL
thi^iLauder
Cynthia

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

P
if

iV

day of October, 2008

NOTARY PUBLIC

RICHARD N. BARNES
2825 E CottonwoodPkwy.Ste 500
Salt take City. Utah 84121
My Commission Expires

September 9. 2010
STATE O F U T A H

Notary Public
Residing in Sz
Salt Lake County, Utatt /
My Commission Expires:
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3.

At the time I purchased my property, the drop in elevation from the fence in dispute was

well north of the disputed property and was a gentle slope.

2
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Richard N. Barnes (#8892)
Christopher F. Lewis (#8556)
STEP AN LEWIS & PAXMAN, LC
7410 S. Creek Road, Suite 100
Sandy, Utah 84093
Telephone: (801) 233-0606
Facsimile: (801) 233-0607
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE AND DIANE MARTIN,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF EDWIN LAUDER

vs.

Case No.: 070916752

EDWIN AND CYNTHIA LAUDER,
individuals, and JOHN AND MARY BEST
FERGUSON, individuals,

Judge: L.A. Dever

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Edwin Lauder, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this

Affidavit
2.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah, am over 18 years of age and make the

statements herein based on my personal knowledge.
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DATED this

a^

day of December, 2008.

Edwin Lauder

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

?

_ day of December, 2008.

NOTARY PUBLIC
RICHARD N. BARNES
2825 £ Cottonwood Pkwy. Ste 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
My Commission Expires

September 9, 2010

STATE OF UTAH

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County,
My Commission Expires
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Richard N. Barnes (#8892)
Christopher F. Lewis (#8556)
STEPAN LEWIS & PAXMAN, LC
7410 S. Creek Road, Suite 100
Sandy, Utah 84093
Telephone: (801) 233-0606
Facsimile: (801)233-0607
Attorney for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRUCE AND DIANE MARTIN,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF TONY SHIRAKI

vs.

Case No.: 070916752
EDWIN AND CYNTHIA LAUDER,
individuals, and JOHN AND MARY BEST
FERGUSON, individuals,

Judge: L.A/Dever

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Tony Shiraki, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this

Affidavit.
2.

I moved onto the property to the West of the Eskelsons in 1975.

3.

Sometime during the 1970's, Joe and Helen Eskelson built a fence on the northern
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Richard N.Barnes (#8892)
Christopher F. Lewis (#8556)
STEP AN LEWIS & PAXMAN, LC
7410 S. Creek Road, Suite 100
Sandy, Utah 84093
Telephone: (801) 233-0606
Facsimile: (801) 233-0607
Attorney for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRUCE AND DIANE MARTIN,
Plaintiffs,

:
:

vs.
EDWIN AND CYNTHIA LAUDER,
individuals, and JOHN AND MARY BEST
FERGUSON, individuals,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

:
:
:
:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN K. CLARK

Case No.: 070916752

Judge: L.A. Dever

:

)
) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Stephen K. Clark, being first duly sworn, hereby declares and states as follows:
1.

I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this

Affidavit.
2.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah, am over 18 years of age and make the

statements herein based on my personal knowledge.
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13.

During the period in which I owned the Lauder Property, a fence line ran near and along

the South side of the Lauder Property and the Ferguson Property (hereinafter the "Fence") in the
area that is in dispute in the above-reference law suit (hereinafter the "Disputed Area").
14.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, there were no improvements made to the Fence.
15.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, no one ever removed weeds from or in the Disputed Area.
16.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, no one ever planted grapevines or any other plants in the
Disputed Area.
17.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, no grapevines were on or in the Disputed Area.
18.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, no one ever chased away pests in the Disputed Area.
19.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, no neighbors on the South side of the Fence in the Disputed
Area accessed, maintained, or used the strip of land in the Disputed Area.
20.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, I am not aware of ever having seen anyone but my wife and
myself in the Disputed Area.
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DATED this

^

day of December, 2008.

Stephen K. Clark
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

NOTARY PUBLIC
RlCK-'-'C M SA^.MES
2 8 2 * fc :;on v .w«ooo •***•>
^ ^ 0 0
rsi,S!
••'v?- ::, l> -Jr<#.n 8^121
v
v ' ' • ' • • »!>.?.or E x p i r e s
SepiefnoeH 9. 2 0 1 0

_ STATE OF UTAH

l

J

day of December, 2008.

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, UtaW
My Commission Expires:
^7 / / ? , * © •
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Mark O. Morris (4636)
Emily Jackson (11678)
Snell& Wilmer LLP.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Beneficial Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE and DIANE MARTIN, individuals,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
EDWIN and CYNTHIA LAUDER,
individuals, and MARY BEST FERGUSON,
an individual,

AFFIDAVIT OF DIANE MARTIN

Civil No.: 070916752
Honorable L.A. Dever

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

Diane Martin, beingfirstduly sworn, herby declares and states as follows:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah, am ova: 18 years of age and make the

statements herein based on my personal knowledge.
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11.

My family and I further placed construction debris, including some extra curb and

gutter, in the strip of land for storage and to help hold up the hill against erosion.
12.

Until the early 1990s, and from my personal observations, I saw that the area

beyond my parents' fence and strip of land was vacant and unused.
13.

Upon taking possession in 2007, we commenced a survey to establish the true

boundary line because we knew that the old fence did not serve as the true property line.
14.

Our survey confirmed that the legal boundary line follows a straight path

approximately one to four feet beyond the crooked chain link fence.
15.

Accordingly, we sought to remove the old chain link fence and install a new fence

along the surveyed boundary line.
16.

My family and I always treated the strip of land as our rightfully owned property

17.

My husband and I have never acquiesced, either expressly or impliedly, to the

chain link fence replacing the true surveyed boundary line.
18.

The matters stated in this declaration are true and correct to the best of my

personal knowledge and are made under the penalty of perjury pursuant to Utah law.
19.

My parents before me, and my husband and I since 2006 have paid property taxes

on the full area of my deeded property, including on my deeded property that Defendants claim
they have owned since they bought their homes in the early to mid-90's.
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Mark O. Morris (4636)
Emily Jackson (11678)
Snell & Wilmer LLP.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Beneficial Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE and DIANE MARTIN, individuals,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF DARRELL ESKELSON

VS.

EDWIN and CYNTHIA LAUDER,
individuals, and MARY BEST FERGUSON,
an individual,

Civil No.: 070916752
Honorable L.A. Dever

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Darrell Eskelson, beingfirstduly sworn, herby declares and states as follows:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah, am over 18 years of age and make the

statements herein based on my personal knowledge.

9243965

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DATED this

/*>

day of November, 2008.

t

Darrell Eskelson

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J 3 day of November, 2008

NOTARY PUBLIC

, NOTARY ElfBfLIC
SHAUNA R. DENOS
3876 Center"View Way.
West Jordan, Utah 84QB4
My Commission Expires

July 7. 20^0

STATE OT&ffTAH

9243965
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C O N D E N S E D TRANSCRIPT

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

* *

BRUCE and DIANE MARTIN,
individuals,
Plaintiffs,

Deposition of:

vs.

STEPHEN K. CLARK

EDWIN and CYNTHIA LAUDER,
individuals; and MARY BEST
FERGUSON,

Civil No. 070916752

Defendants.

Judge L.A. Dever
*

* *

March 3, 2009
9:09 a.m.

Offices of Mark 0. Morris
SNELL & WILMER
1200 Beneficial Tower
15 West South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah

* **
Jamie R. Brey
Registered Professional Reporter.

DEPOMAXMERIT
: LITIGATION S E R V I C E S
TOLL FREE 800337-6629
PHONE 801-328-1188
FAX 801-328-1189

333 SOUTH RIO GRANDE
SALT LAKE Crrv, UTAH

84101

VWVW.DEPOMAXMERIT.COM
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9:09 a.m.
PROCEEDINGS
STEPHEN K. CLARK,

6 called as a witness for and on behalf of the plaintiffs,
7 being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as
8 follows:
9
10
EXAMINATION
11
12 BY MR. MORRIS:

(.aw
Road,

100

Utah

Salt I^akc Citv, Utah
March 3, 200*9

1

A !' I' K A R A N C K 5

2
3
4

J

INSCRIPTION

84093

13
14
15
16
17

Q. Good morning, Mr. Clark, my name is Mark
Morris. I represent the Martins, who live kind of up the
hill and over the fence from the land you once owned in this
area. I assume you're familiar with the area that we're
talking about?

18
A. Yes, lam.
19
Q. Have you ever been deposed before?
20
A. No.
21
Q. Thank you for coming today. I'm glad I didn't
22 have to serve a subpoena on you. I don't expect this will
23 take longer than an hour or two. What have you done to
24 prepare for your deposition today?
25
A. Reflected on the time that I owned that.
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1 with others. So it's going to be important for your

2 since you graduated from college.

2 testimony today for you to differentiate between what you

3

3 know, what others have told you and what youVe just

A.

I worked as a operations manager at a

4 assuming. Is that fair?

4 third-party insurance administrator for their computer
5 department. And I went and became a programmer and then a

5

6 research and developer manager. And then director of

6 understanding —

A.

It is. You asked me what the dispute was as my

7 research and development for a computer manufacturer.

7

Q.

Right.

8

8

A.

- and that's my understanding of the dispute.

9

Q.

Okay. You went on to say that traditionally

I went on my own for many years in joint

9 venture with a — with White Hall Corporation, worked for
10 them in a business incubation environment for about eight

10 everyone thought the fence was the boundary line. And so I

11 y e a r s . Then worked with SatMetrix Systems, a customer

11 need to explore that a little and find out -

12 satisfaction company, managing their Salt Lake operations.

12

A.

13

13

Q.

— what you mean by everyone.

14

A.

Well, my — you know, this is new to me.

15 dental implant training kind of - kinds of sequence.

15

Q.

Sure.

16

Is that what you're doing now, you're a ~

16

A.

T h e understanding that people are in a dispute

And then went on my own and started a company

14 with my brother, which we do dental implant management and
Q.

Sure. Sure.

17

A.

Uh-huh.

17 would obviously mean there's some contest over where it is.

18

Q.

- part owner as well as a business manager?

18 So I — you know, that's - I assumed that's why I'm here.

19

A.

Uh-huh.

19 That's my understanding of it.

20

Q.

Yes?

20

21

A.

Yes.

21 dispute.

22

Q.

Okay. Thanks.

22

Tell me what you know about the dispute between

23

MR. LAUDER: Ed.

24 my clients and the Lauders and their neighbors?

24

THK WITNESS: Ed and...

25

25

MR. BARNES: Richard.

23
A.

That the - the neighbors have claimed that

Q.
A.

Tell me who you have spoken to about this
Rick.

Page 10
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1 they have more property than is — than everyone's tradition.

1

2 And it's just disputed so they're trying to establish a new

2 IIY MR. MORRIS:

THK WITNESS: And Richard.

3 boundary line.

3

Q.

You haven^t spoken with Cynthia?

4

You mentioned "tradition." What do you mean by

4

A.

I don't believe so.

5

Q.

So your knowledge about this dispute comes from

Well, everyone, I think, is believed to the

6 Ed or Richard a n d no one else?

Q.

5 that?
1 6

A.

7 boundary was where the fences were and it seems that that's

7

A.

Y'eah.

8 now in dispute.

8

Q.

O k a y . When was the first time you learned that

9

Q.

When you say "everyone," tell me who you're

110 speaking of.
11

A.

9 there was a dispute about where the boundary should be?
10

Well, that's why I'm here is I'm not disputing

A.

Sometime last fall hi a phone call from — I

11 believe it was from Richard.

12 it. 1 didn't have any dispute. Apparently they and their

i 12

Q.

Do you know approximately what month, day?

13 neighbors are having the dispute, so...

1 13

A.

Certainly not the day. It would have been — I

14

Q.

But when you say everyone has assumed that the

14 don't know the month. It was probably — it was in the fall.

15 fence is the boundary, I need to understand who you mean by

15

16 everyone.

16 Would that help you know if it was a week before or a month

17

17 before?

A,

Well, clearly someone is disputing it because

Q.

You signed your affidavit on December 9th.

18 there wouldn't be a — there wouldn't be this argument. Uhm,

18

19 1 believed that the - myself and apparently those who have

19 month or more.

20 lived in the property now for a period of time all believed

20

121 that was the boundary. The neighbor with the fence

21 phone call?

A.
Q.

It was a period of time before, probably a
And tell me about that very first — it was a

22 apparently doesn't believe that's the boundary. So that

22

A.

Uh-huh.

23 seems to be the dispute as I understand it. I don't know.

23

Q.

Okay. Yes?

| 24

A.

I'm sorry, yes, it was a phone call.

| 25

Q.

Sorry. I'll keep bugging you about that just

24

Q.

Okay. I understand, you know, your

25 understanding is going to be gained in part from speaking
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1 there was a dispute about the boundary. Was he any more
2 specific than that? Did he talk about the fence per se or --

1 anyway, you don't recall looking at any papers?
2
A. I can't remember. 1 might have. I can't

3 can you recall?
4
A- I actually don't recall any of the details of

3 remember. 1 can't remember. It seemed a minor matter in m

5 that, no.

5 kinds of things. I just - it wasn't a big deal to me so I
6 don't remember. I might have. I might not have. I can't

6

Q.

4 mind that wasn't -- that 1 was keeping track of any of these

Okay. And you say there was a second phone

7 call after the first?
8
A. Uhm, yeah, well, there was a - or at least
9 there was a phone call or a request to get together and talk
10 for a minute with his attorney and -- and I said, "Sure,
11 that's fine. Come on over."
12
Sometime later they came — we — we — the
13 gist of that was to arrange a time that we might talk. I'm
14 sure at that time we went into more detail about what the
15 dispute was, so...
J6
Q. Well, "that time" being the second phone call
17 or the actual meeting where you all got together?
18
A. Uhm, I don't remember which, to be honest.
19
Q. At some point, though, you had a conversation
20 with Ed and was Richard present on the phone or in person?
21
A. Uhm, if the call was from — and I don't
22 remember who it was from. It was to say, "Can I stop by and
23 visit with you with an attorney," and I said sure. It was
24 'just to arrange a time that that could be done. And then —
25 and I don't remember the length of the conversation. But the

7 remember at this time.
8
Q. You mentioned earlier that when Ed had first
9 called you, he assured you that there was no issue with you
10 about the sale of the property or anything like that. Is
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And sitting here today, you understand no one
is claiming that you misrepresented where the boundaries of
the property were. Right?
A. Right.
Q. And we'll get back to the period of time when
you sold the property and then bought it. But from this
meeting with Mr. Barnes and Mr. Lauder to today; no one has
suggested that you've done anything wrong, have they?
A. No.
Q. So as you're testifying today, you're not
concerned that regardless of what happens in this dispute,
it's not going to reflect on you?
A. I have no concern of that, no.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Q. So if the fence turns out not to be the
boundary, you don't have any concerns today about anything
that occurred at the time you sold the property or since?
A. I have no stake in it and I have no concern
over the outcome. I think that I just will provide my memory
of what - what was - what I observed.
Q, Okay. Fair enough.
So this meeting with Mr. Barnes and Mr. Lauder,
how long did that last at your home?
A. I don't know. It wasn't long. It wasn't — I
don't know. I can't remember to be honest. Sorry.
Q. Longer than an hour?
A. No. It would be less than an hour.
Q. As best you can recall, and let's leave out the
swimming, what do you recall being discussed in that meeting
with Mr. Barnes and Mr. Lauder about anything having to do
with the dispute with their neighbors?
A . I think I asked questions about, uhm, the —

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

the specifics of the dispute, who was involved, what were the
distances that were involved, who was making the allegations
and why. Who — clarifying type information.
Q. What were you told in answer to those
questions?
A. That it was the back boundary, that the fence
line had been there but that there was a property line that

Page 2C

Page 18
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
113
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

purpose was to establish a meeting time as I recall.
Q. And did they come and meet with you at your
home or at your work?
A. They came to my home. I work in Heber, so it's
not very convenient for people to meet me there.
Q. AH right. And how soon before December 9th do
you think that meeting in your home was with Mr. Barnes and
Mr. Lauder?
A. Probably, uhm — you know, clearly I don't
remember exactly. But it would have been maybe a few days,
maybe a week, in that span of time.
Q. Okay. Who was present during that meeting?
A. I think just Ed and the attorney.
Q. The three of you?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Did either of them bring with them any papers
for you to look at?
A.

I — I don't remember. I don't remember when

21 papers came. They clearly provided some papers for my
22 review. I don't remember if it was at that meeting or
23 if they had — if they were sent separately. I can't
J 24 remember.
25
Q. Okay. But at that meeting, sitting here today
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1 got to change this"?
2
MR. 1'iARNKS: Objection. Calls for speculation.

1 was -- as we were in those dreaming phases, that it would
2 deliver to us.
3
Q. Okay. Was there anything else during that
4 meeting that you can recall discussing that you haven't
5 already told me?
6
A. No, I don't think so.
7
Q. How soon after that meeting did you have

3
4
5
6
7

8 contact again with either Mr. Barnes or Mr. Lauder?
9
A. Sometime later to — to deliver the signed

9

8 I5V MR. MORRIS:

10 documents - or the document. And, I'm sorry, the sequence
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

THK WITNKSS: i doift - I don't recall. I was
comfortable with the accuracy of the details when it was
executed, and that was the only thing that was really my
concern is that — that I not execute something I was not
totally comfortable with.
Q.

Okay. Well, let's have a look at it. Let's

10 just refer to this as the Lauder property, the lot that we're
11 talking about here. Okay?
12
A. (No oral response.)

of times eludes me. It was not long after but I don't know
how long after.
Q. Okay.
A. I probably didn't respond, and so he probably
had to chase me a few times because I do a fair amount of
travel and such. Uhm, so it would have been just academic
efforts to try to link up or for me to follow through on the
document.
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 1 was marked
for identification.)

13
Q. I know it was yours at one time. You mentioned
14 a subdivision, that you did quite a bit of research before
15 you bought; right?
16
A. Yes, uh-huh.
17
Q. Could you on this piece of paper, as best you
18 can recall, draw just an outline or a map, if you will, of
19 what you refer to as the subdivision as you use that word?
20
And where is East Rich Way on what you've drawn
BY MR. MORRIS:
21 here? Would you mind just writing East Rich Way on those
Q. Let me show you what we've marked as Exhibit 1
22 dotted lines you've put there?
for your deposition. Mr. Clark, have you seen that document 23 / -7Tr~"East Ridge Way?
"""^-^^^
before?
\24
Q. I'm just looking at your affidavit and it says >v
A. Yes, I have.
J [25 1898 Rich Way, R-i-c-h.
J

Page 2p
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8
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10
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Q. Is that your signature on the last page?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. I notice Richard Barnes was the notary who
signed this. Where did you sign this? Where were you?
A. Probably standing on my front porch.
Q. If I wanted to go and find the version of this
that's sitting on a hard drive somewhere, where would I go?
A. I have no clue. I don't know.
Q. It's not on your computer, is it?
A. No, it's not.
Q. And had you seen a draft of this before you
signed it on your porch?
A. Yes, uh-huh.
Q. How much prior to December 9th did you see a
draft?

> LA

16
17
18
19
120
21
22
23
24
25

A. I don't know how long. I have an image in my
mind of the document sitting on my microwave in my kitchen
for — for a period of time while waiting to deliver it
again. I travel a lot. So I — so it was some period of
time. I don't know.
Q. Did you make changes to the draft that he gave
you and say, "No, this is wrong"?
A. I can't remember if I did or not.
Q. Is that something you think you would remember
if he had gotten something wrong and you said, "No, no, we've

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
110
11
12
13
14
15

A. I thought you said ridge. It's Ric>rye"s7 So
iTs^n<4ridge, it's Rich.
^^^^^^
Q. Okay. And whicnwas the lot that you bought?
A. I don't know. These — these — let me just
clarify that these lines that I've made strikes to are
indicating that there were lots there. Where those lots were
and specifically the count on those lots, I'm not trying to
pretend that I'm representing those with any degree of
accuracy. I'm just saying that there were lots in these
areas. So because of that, I'm going to scribble those lot
lines out. And I'm going to —
Q. Let's give you a new piece of paper if you're
not comfortable with that one. Try to be as accurate as you
can.
A. So those are roads. And my lot was in that

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
124
125

area.
Q. Okay. How many — so the subdivision was made
up of lots. You know, I'd like you to try to be a little
more detailed in that part.
A. I'm sorry, that's the best I can do.
Q. Well, I know you can do better than this.
A. Would you like me to draw — well, please help
me to know what I need to draw.
Q. Sure. I'd like you, as best you can recall, to
tell me or describe on paper what the subdivision was that
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1
Q. Okay. So you testified a little while ago
2 about how carefully you investigated this subdivision before
3 you bought this lot?
4
A. Uh-huh.
5
Q. Sitting here today, though, you don't recall
6 how many lots or houses lay to the east of the lot that you

! it?
2
A. No, it was not.
3
Q. So you don't remember if there were one or two
4 or three empty lots between the existing home and the lot
5 that you bought?
6
A. No, I don't. There were -- there were no

7
7 eventually bought on Rich Way?
8
8
A. There was no - there were no buildings. There
9 was perhaps one home had been completed at the time I bought 9
10
10 it, and there was no point of reference to have made a count.
11 The only way I would have, even at that time when I did study 11
12
12 it, would have been to walk it with a map of the place. So
13
13 no, I don't recall. But I don't think that's unusual.
14
14
Q. I'm not suggesting it's usual or unusual. I'm
15
15 just trying to find out what you can recall.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. Right.
Q. Sitting here today, you don't recall how many
individual lots? Even after you had a map in your hand, you
don't recall how many individual lots lay to the east of the
lot that you finally bought?
A. The map that I would have carried at the time,
it was for reference, would have been provided by that
builder. And I would have used it as a point of reference.
Uhm, without referencing a map, even at the time, it wouldn't
be easy to know.

structures.
Q. Can you just put an MKHM where you recall the
existing home being on your drawing here?
Okay.
And so let's go to your lot now and to the west
of your lot, do you recall how many — first of all, how many
lots there were as you work your way around the loop here?
A. No. I don't.
Q. Do you remember how far away there was a lot on

16 which anyone was building anything or had built anything?
17
A. I believe it was on the lower — the lower
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

portion here.
Q. Why don't you just put a circle with an X where
you think that first one of those was.
A. There was actually multiple homes in that area.
There was some existing -- oh, I'm sorry, I drew that in the
park. And then there were some in this area. Ended up being
a model home in that area.
Q. Okay. So there were also lots across the

Page 34

Page 36

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18 careful in your answers and you have told me about how
18
19 important the view was to you. My question was: Do you know 19
20 today how many individual lots lay to the east of the lot
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

So clearly, no, I don't. And I don't have that
map for reference. But I can tell you that I walked from the
existing home, the one that was built at the time that I did
it, all the way around this whole area in trying to make a
decision not based on anything except the slope and the view.
And so, yeah, I - when I finally narrowed that selection, it
was based on our goal to have a view both east — both north
and west that would maybe be unobstructed.
But there were no structures there. So it was
a - it was a tough guess. But that was our intent. Our
intent was to — and as I recall, it sloped in such a way
that we would have an advantage in our lot. Because those
who would be built to the west of us would be lower than us.
It's just the way the slope worked.
Q. Do you remember what my question was?
A. I'm sorry, no, I don't.
Q. I do — I know you're trying to be complete and

21 that you eventually bought?
22
A. No, I don't.
23
24

Q.
A.

You say there was an existing home to the east?
Yes.

25

Q.

It wasn't adjacent to the lot you bought, was

street on Rich Way here?
A. Yes, uh-huh.
Q. And on Rich Way, on the north side of Rich Way
on this part of the road, do you remember if there were any
existing homes at the time you bought this lot?
A. There was construction.
Q. So why don't you just put a circle and an X
wherever you can recall construction taking place at the time
you bought your lot.
A. In that area there.
Q. Okay.
Now, to the south of this — and this
subdivision, can you just draw a line for me where you
assumed the boundary line to the subdivision lay, the
southern boundary line?
A. This is the back of the lots.
Q. Okay. And up here were there existing homes
overlooking the subdivision?
A. Yes, there were.
Q.

And were they — any of them under construction

21 or did they appear to you to have been there for a while?
22
23
24
25

A.
Q.

I recall them being fairly established.
Okay.
MR. MORRIS: Mark that as Exhibit 2.
*
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Richard N. Barnes (#8892)
Christopher F. Lewis (#8556)
STEPAN LEWIS & PAXMAN, LC
7410 S. Creek Road, Suite 100
Sandy, Utah 84093
Telephone: (801) 233-0606
Facsimile: (801) 233-0607
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRUCE AND DIANE MARTIN,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN K. CLARK

vs.

Case No.: 070916752

EDWIN AND CYNTHIA LAUDER,
individuals, and JOHN AND MARY BEST
FERGUSON, individuals,

Judge: L.A. Dever

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Stephen K. Clark, being first duly sworn, hereby declares and states as follows:
1.

I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this

Affidavit
2.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah, am over 18 years of age and make the

statements herein based on my personal knowledge.
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j f

3.

I .-,•:/

•

•

, •

• ; •• i' '. ,• ;i i ro.naiiej t:.c ~i,au<ki Property") now owned

h\ Defendants Edv -i. and Cynthia Laudci (hereinafter the "Lauders"), located at 1898 E. Rich

;

4.

I purchased the Lauder Proper! v * H

^-

5.

/ vI ler purchasing the Lauder Property and

i * * -M
• r. • old the I auder Property to the Lauders,

through their builder, on or about December 1991, the Laudci i'u r n\ consisted only of an
er iipity l o t .

6.

. •

•

•:

I am familiar with (IK- - Mui-r Property and the adjoii ling property, now owed by

Defendant Mary Host Ferguson (hereinafter the "Ferguson Property"), having visited frequently.
1.

I am familiar with the adjacent property tot he s- mih t i\ owned by Joe Eskelson and

now niwncd hv I "faint!! Ls Bruce and Diane Martin (hereinafter the "Martin Property").
8.

I am familiar with the state and condition of the Lauder Property and Ferguson Property

jiuiii | he year I Wb uul'il I sold my portion of the property to the Lauders in December 1991.
9.

I am familiar of the state and condition of the Lauder Property and Ferguson Property

based on my own personal observations during the times that I visited the Lauder Property
following my purchase of it in 1986.
I

sited the Lauder Property several times after purchasing it.

II,

I walked the boundaries of the property several times.

II

It was my original intent to build on the Lauder Property when we bought it on June 11,

1986,

2
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13.

During the period in which I owned the Lauder Property, a fence line ran near and along

the South side of the Lauder Property and the Ferguson Property (hereinafter the "Fence") in the
area that is in dispute in the above-reference law suit (hereinafter the "Disputed Area").
14.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, there were no improvements made to the Fence.
15.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, no one ever removed weeds from or in the Disputed Area.
16.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, no one ever planted grapevines or any other plants in the
Disputed Area.
17.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, no grapevines were on or in the Disputed Area,
18.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, no one ever chased away pests in the Disputed Area.
19.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, no neighbors on the South side of the Fence in the Disputed
Area accessed, maintained, or used the strip of land in the Disputed Area.
20.

Based on my personal observations, from the time I purchased the property on June 11,

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, I am not aware of ever having seen anyone but my wife and
myself in the Disputed Area.

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

ITO/M

ilic (nil'1 I purchased the property on June 11 1 086 until I sold it to the I ,auders, it

was my belief that the Fence that was in the Disp 'V ! "'<•

••

p

• >

*.

i ^-. we

r . ;K- ^r.;\; jy me boundary li ne
YCK" the Uim 1 purchased the proprrl\ iMi Inn* I I I \tt • Ji• f• J I iki il lo flic Lauders, we
,. *• -. hf , •>.. i .-I-,,- .i* the boundary line.
23.

When my wife and I would visit I hi Lnnl'i I'M pnp, • r i *i i • I'IC tunc I purchased the

pmpeity on June J 1, 1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, we would occasionally walk around the
Lauder Property.
24.

When my wife and I would visit the Lauder Property from the tin :ie I pi i rchased the

property on June 11, 1986 until I sold it i\) lhr I atiilns, •hen v./;iikitig on I he Lauder Property, we
walked along the Fence in the Disputed Area.
25.

From the time I purchased t h e p m p n h

'ii """"t ill, I u* until I s<.id it to the Lauders, my

wife and I treated the Fence in the Disputed Area as the boundary line and we believed it to be
the true and correct boundary I i 11 (
'()

From the time I purchased the property on June f 1, 1986 until I sold it to the Lauder

neighbor to the South ever went on possess* *d, »>i too k any actions that I am aware of to suggest
that the Fence in the Disputed Area was not the true and correct boundary line.
From the time I purchased the (w u( m < < < i

1986 until I sold it to the Lauders, no

individual I am aware of ever used or asserted control of the property in the Disputed A i t t
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DATED this

^

day of December, 2008.

Stephen K. Clark
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

NOTABY PUBLIC
RICK'-<C N S A ^ N £ S
J*\ • r..«-i.., 8r> , 0f . £ „ p i f e s
Sfeple»T>o©i j^. 2 0 ) 0

STATE OP U T A H

J

day of December, 2008.

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, l£
My Commission Expires:

%A?
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LOT 206.
BRIGHTON Ki'lGi: / .

sumirrofrs

ctRnncAtr

l TRAMS n. COWER. SYRACUSE, UTAN, DO HERCOY cERnry tmt i AU A UCENSO LANO
SUR^YOR ANO THAT I HOLS LKXHX
NO. 61J9J64 AS PRCSCRI9C0 i t THC LAWS Of

THE STATE or VTAH AHO Tmr i HA* mac A suavcr or m BOUNDAACS or tut

ra. LOWING oescxeeo w w m

/ fURTHCR CTRTVY THAT THS PLAT CORRCCTLf SHOWS THC WOC QtUCMSIONS 0T THC
BOVNOAMES SUAVrrtO
ANO Or mi W S B t f INfWQVCUCNTS CTTCIWff THC $OVNOAM£$

ANO THEIR POSITION w REUTIONSHJP TO SAJO BOONOMICSI THAT MOHC of
IMPROVEMENTS ON me

pweims!

AOQvC peSCMKD

ANO THAT NO mac

t+QPCRTI

ENCROACH VfOM

ui>*ovti#nTS, mces

m v > e ? n n ENCROACH UPON THC suoxcr

THC w w t t

AOJOtmNO

o* civcs or

Aoxmrne

PROPCKTY EXCEPT AS SHOWN,

I ALSO nmrncR CERTITY THAT THIS PLAT DOCS NOT puttpour no osctosc
owmm
GATS, ofi BOUNDARY UNC otsmms or me PROPCRTY simctto
WHICH WOULD K
DISCLOSED $Y AH ACCURATE SURVEY or me AOJO**NO mowmcs,
NO* ooes it
PURPORT TO oisciose OWNERSHIP or on CLAWS or CASEMENTS OR
CHOAAWAJKO
UPON THC PROPERTY SV*YC*EU

_JL

TRAVIS R. CO*t*, PIS /*4J9J64

LEGEND

Cuttt*

Un*

GENERAL NOTES

i.

OP

THE BASIS or BEARING roR THIS SURVEY WAS esusi/snco

BCTWCEN POUNO BRASS

uoNUMNrs AT THE INTERSECTION or ROSAUNO emeu: AND ROSAUNO o*i*t AMP

AIONO THE CENTERLINE or ROSAUNO OR/VC AS SHOWN ON MIS SURVEY

PUT.

3. All COURSES SHOWN IN PARENTHESIS ARE RECORD INTO/HURON TAKEN IHOH OCTO
DESCRIPTIONS OR OfDCIAl UAPS OR PLATS Of RfCORO. AU OTHER COURSES ART THC
RESULT Or ACTUAL HEIO NEASUREUCNTS,

S2007-08-0654
Reid J . Demman, P.L.S.
SALT LAK6 COUNTY SURVEYOR
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